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Saibal Ghosh1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The need for an international supervisory framework arises from the 
globalisation of banking business – the fact that ‘the jurisdiction of national 
regulators is smaller than the geographical business area of regulated financial 
institutions’1 (Goodhart et al., 1998)1.  This global reach of domestic business and 
vice versa has systemic implications for both host and home countries. With 
greater access to international markets being ensured by recent international 
initiatives, domestic / international financial institutions, national supervisors, 
investors and rating agencies are driving the development of global standards 
based on international benchmarks and best practices. Ongoing international 
efforts towards development of minimum standards and harmonization have 
come into focus following the renewed interest by policy makers in bank 
soundness. The reasons for the same are not too far to seek. Driven by the twin 
forces of liberalisation and innovation, the financial landscape has witnessed a 
virtual metamorphosis over the last three decades. This has resulted in substantial 
increase in the importance of the financial sector: permitting the channelisation of 
a greater quantum of investible resources and their allocation into high 
productivity outlets, promoting faster routes of growth and sounder economic 
development. On the flip side however, this transformation of the financial 
marketplace has extended and tightened linkages across markets and institutions, 
increased the uniformity of the information set available to economic agents and 
encouraged greater similarity in the assessment of information. This, in effect, has 
meant that weaknesses in the financial system can have serious and far more 
disruptive economic ramifications than was previously the case and engender 
                                                 
1The author is an Officer in the Department of Economic Analysis and Policy, Reserve Bank of India, 
Fort, Mumbai 400001. INDIA. Mail ID: saibalghosh@rbi.org.in. The views expressed in the paper are 
entirely personal. 
  2 
contagion effects extending well beyond national boundaries (Crockett, 2001)2.  
Evidence in support of the same both at the international and national levels have 
been quite abound. The Mexican crisis of 1994-95, the East Asian crises of 1997-98 
and the more recent crises in Argentina and Turkey are ample testimony to this 
fact. At the national level, the banking crises in Nordic countries in the 1980s and 
1990s, the problems in Philippines and Korean banking systems in the 1990s (and 
the near panic at the time of the LTCM affair) and the financial bubble in Japan 
whose costs are felt even at present deserve mention, for which the weaknesses in 
the application of prudential standards by banks and the inefficacy of the 
supervisory framework were cited as one of the main causes (Table 1).  
In the absence of any international financial regulatory body with a 
mandate from the nations, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
from the G-10 countries has been pro-actively engaged in the task of developing 
standards and enhancing coordination and co-operation amongst national 
supervisors. 
Efforts at harmonisation in banking regulation and supervision have been 
rendered overtly complex by the diverse range of practices in implementing 
capital adequacy standards, loan loss classification and provisioning, differences 
in the legal and institutional frameworks and the varied accounting standards 
and fiscal regimes in which banks in different countries operate. One basic duality 
is the broad division of the international banking system into those banks, which 
have been following such standards (and thus, those which conform to 
‘international best practice’) and those that have only recently begun aspiring 
towards attaining such standards. This duality has, in its wake, led to the call for 
development of differential standards for sophisticated and less sophisticated 
banks, internationally active and domestically active banks and as a corollary, to 
developed economies and developing/emerging/transition economies. The 
forerunner of banking standards, the capital Accord of 1988 made a distinction 
between internationally active banks and other banks, while the New Capital 
Accord speaks, in addition, of a class of sophisticated banks to which 
international standards could be applicable.   
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The work of the Basel Committee, which has taken a lead in the promotion 
and harmonisation of banking standards, has focused primarily on G-10 countries 
and their internationally active banks. Such a structure tends to lead to a sort of 
‘Stackelberg equilibria’ wherein decisions based on practices in developed 
countries spills over onto emerging countries. Given that national circumstances 
in developed economies are often quite at variance with those in emerging 
economies, this might engender a Pareto-inferior outcome for the latter. The 
reasons for the G-10 concentric structure of bank supervision effort at the 
international level are not far to seek. First, it has been argued that over 80 per 
cent of global banking assets rest with banks incorporated in these countries. 
Consequently, supervisory focus of banking systems in these countries would 
need to be a priority agenda. Second, with state-of-the-art information technology 
being used by banks in these countries, it was believed that a pro-active approach 
to banking supervision in these countries would necessarily stave off any failures 
and also addresses the dangers of contagion arising thereof. 
Table 1: Costs of Financial Crises 
Country Period Cost (percent of GDP) 
Argentina 1980-82 
2001- 
55 
2 
Chile 1981-86 42 
Finland 1991-94 11.2 
Norway 1987-93 8.0 
Indonesia 1997-98 55 
Japan 1990-99 24 
Malaysia 1997-98 16.4 
Mexico 1994-97 19.3 
Philippines 1981-87 7 
South Korea 1997-98 28 
Thailand 1997-98 34.8 
USA (S&L) 1984-91 3.2 
Turkey 2000- 30.5 
 Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).3 
 
While these facts might have had a fair degree of credibility in an autarkic 
world, the inference may not be as sacrosanct at present. Recurring crises over the 
past two decades in both the developed and developing world have provided 
graphic evidence of the fact that, given the globalisation and univeralisation of 
banking operations, the onset of banking crises can impact the banking systems in 
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both the home and host countries in equal measure, either directly or even 
indirectly, through contagion effects. And since banking crises are more difficult 
to accurately predict and have far more devastating effects on the macro-economy 
(Goldstein et al., 2000)4, proactive supervision of banks in developed economies 
while necessary, is not sufficient to prevent failures. And increasingly, with both 
international and domestic banking systems coming under the same regulatory 
umbrella and the growing interest in adoption of international standards being 
shown by the non G-10 countries, the distinction between ‘internationally active’ 
versus ‘domestic’ banks, on the one hand, and ’sophisticated’ and ‘less 
sophisticated’ banks, on the other, could cease to have less relevance than in the 
past.  However, while banking systems across countries have exhibited an 
element of convergence in the adoption of capital standards, the harmonisation in 
the institutional, legal and fiscal infrastructure in different countries has not 
materialized as yet. For instance, a survey conducted for 129 countries 
participating in the ninth International Conference of Banking Supervision 
showed that in 1996, more than 90 per cent of the 129 countries applied Basel-like 
risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements (Goodhart et al., 1998)5. The 
approach taken by several developing countries has been not to call for 
differential standards, but to seek a greater transition time to evolve to attaining 
these standards and to seek a degree of flexibility in the rules governing best 
practices, which internalize country-specific features. In fact, several supervisory 
authorities have argued for the case that national supervisors may be given 
discretion to implement the new Accord, in a phased manner by banks, which are 
not internationally active and are engaged predominantly in traditional banking. 
What needs to be sought is a greater say by the developing countries in 
transnational efforts in the framing of the harmonised standards (regulation) and 
the monitoring of their implementation (supervision) (see, for instance, the 
discussion in Davies et al., 1999).6    
 
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
There are two particular types of government networks that are most 
relevant to global economic issues. The relatively formal type of network is 
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composed of trans-governmental regulatory organisations. The second, less 
formal type of network is formed through agreements between domestic 
regulatory agencies. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) serves as a perfect 
example of the more formal type of network. The central bank governors of the G-
10 countries established the Basel Committee in 1975. As the name suggests, this 
is only a committee of the G-10 countries (which includes Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States), which was constituted by the Central Bank 
Governors. The BCBS is not an international organisation and its constituents are 
not member states, but representatives of their respective supervisory 
organisations and central banks. It has no legal standing, lacks a formal charter of 
incorporation, cannot enforce its contracts and its decisions do not have legal 
backing (See, for instance, Alexander, 1997)7. Instead, it exploits its links with the 
national supervisors and the regional groupings to propagate and ensure 
compliance. It has limited budgets and staff and no headquarters of its own, with 
the secretariat being located on the premises of an international organization, the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). This umbilical cord gives the BCBS 
surrogate international status but in actuality, the BCBS is independent of the BIS 
and its decisions are not required to be ratified by the latter. One probable reason 
why the two have not integrated is the fact that the BIS is a club of central banks, 
whereas recent evidence in several countries is a pointer to the fact that the 
banking supervision function, especially in developed economies, is being 
divested with a separate agency (Courtis, 2004)8.  
Despite the fact that the Committee is entirely G-10 centric in composition 
and has only recently increased its consultation with other non-member countries, 
it has acquitted its role as a standard-setter for the rest of the world fairly 
successfully. This is attributed to the approach of 'flexibility' and 'national 
discretion' (Musch, 1997)9, but then this is possibly the only approach which could 
have evolved, when the standards are being put out by a 'club', which has limited 
legal mandate across nations.  
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Even though supervisors are implementing the standards of the Basel 
Committee across the globe, this has not mitigated or prevented financial crises 
(BIS Annual Report, 2001)10. One of the reasons ascribed for this is the failure of 
national supervisors to apply international best practices and the failure of the 
international community to monitor the compliance of countries with these 
practices. The view from the G-10 as enunciated by Davies (2000)11, is that, ‘there 
is a need to enhance supervision, particularly in economies open to capital flows, 
and to strengthen compliance with internationally agreed best practices’.  He 
argues that the club-like approach of the BCBS, which depends upon a 
‘gentlemanly compliance’ with its rules and provides for a peer review based on 
informal contacts, breaks down when some members of the club ‘do not apply the 
rules or where there are marked inconsistencies in the way countries apply them’. 
This failure, in his opinion, is attributed to the fact that  ‘the groups of supervisors 
themselves do not have the basis on which to enforce rules among their voluntary 
membership... the BCBS has tried hard...to reach out beyond its membership, but 
does not have the mandate to do so. So, the last two years have seen a growing, 
albeit far from complete acceptance by supervisors ... that the standard setting role 
of these bodies needs to be complemented by assessing compliance with these 
standards, and these arrangements need to go beyond peer review, which has 
been only modestly successful’.  
While standard setting has and disseminating international (read G-10) best 
practice has been the major contribution of the BCBS, it has not been inclined to 
assume the role of monitoring implementation, pleading a lack of resources and 
mandate for the purpose. It could even be argued that the BCBS was not designed 
for this role, because its initial approach had been confined to designing 
minimum standards, the application of which was intended to be a national 
choice. The move from coordination and cooperation to harmonisation and 
synchronization is both recent and subtle. In the earlier approach, enforcement of 
standards was a national choice, and, in part, influenced by peer pressure. 
Increasingly, however, enforcement of the Basel standards is being influenced 
through the surveillance mechanism of the IMF. The IMF and the World Bank 
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have been closely involved with the recent work of the Basel committee, both in 
designing standards and in monitoring country compliance with the same (for an 
analytical account of the issues involved in the design of the evolving financial 
architecture, see Ahluwalia, 1999)12. This is most evident in the role being played 
by them in the development, promotion and application of the framework of the 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. These institutions were 
instrumental in the design of the framework, and also in the development of the 
revised assessment methodology for quantifying the compliance and making 
cross-country comparisons. However, their most significant contribution to the 
Core Principles exercise will be that of the external assessor for member countries 
of their compliance with the Principles, which is being undertaken under a broad 
‘financial stability’ objective. Mention may be made that the Financial Sector 
Assessment Programme (FSAP) was launched jointly by the IMF and the World 
Bank in May 1999. The FSAP has been designed to address several issues, 
including the need to focus on and strengthen the early detection and 
identification of financial sector vulnerabilities, assess observance and 
implementation of standards, and to develop appropriate policy responses to 
weaknesses in financial systems Assessments under the program encompass a 
wide range of issues including the macroeconomic environment, the regulation, 
supervision and soundness of financial systems, financial markets, systemic risks 
in payment systems as well as institutional and legal arrangements for crisis 
management (Sundararajan et al., 2001).13 
Against this background, it may be noted that the scope of IMF surveillance 
have been expanding from exchange rate policies and structural areas into 
financial sector policies (banking supervision, deposit insurance and financial 
sector regulation). One of the reasons behind this shift is the increasing incidence 
of financial crises, in terms of breadth, severity and frequency (Lindgren et al., 
1996)14. In particular, the Asian crises have focused attention on the potential for 
external crises to be precipitated not only by traditional macroeconomic failures, 
but also by structural weaknesses in the financial sector, aided by lax supervisory 
practices. And, as a part of this, the IMF has been monitoring country compliance 
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with international standards in this field. A recent report which evaluated the 
Fund's Surveillance, recommends that " ...outside the Fund's core areas - 
monitoring international standards should to the maximum extent possible be 
delegated to other international institutions or associations with the necessary 
expertise, with the Fund, because of its existing surveillance role, acting as a 
clearing house for information (IMF, 1999)15. This is a view shared by Davies 
(2000)16, who, in his discussion of the international compliance assessment work, 
observed that ‘in the case of banking supervision....there are some doubts whether 
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have the records they need to 
complete the job.’ 
Despite these reservations about the capacity and mandate of the 
international financial institutions to do this job, recent developments however 
indicate that the role of the Fund in the exercise of financial sector surveillance 
(especially bank supervision and regulation) would only be increasing in the 
coming years (Mohammed, 200117; Reddy, 200318). As mentioned before, the 
critical role assigned to the IMF/World Bank in monitoring country compliance 
with the Core Principles and its integration with the FSSA/FSAP is one. Skeptics 
have however observed that it might be difficult for the IMF and the World Bank 
combining their role as policy adviser with that of impartial assessor (Evans, 
2000)19. While the positive fallout of public assessment of compliance remains 
unquestioned, especially for rating agencies, supervisory authorities, standard-
setting bodies, besides the Fund and the World Bank, not to mention their utility 
to the national authorities in designing and carrying through programmes to 
strengthen financial systems, ‘the full benefits from publication [can] only be 
obtained when there is a critical mass of countries agreeing to publish; and if the 
assessment contains enough details and judgement for comparable quantitative as 
well as qualitative conclusions to be drawn’ (Evans, 2000)20. In view of the above, 
in recent times, demand is also being placed upon the Fund to develop macro-
prudential indicators (MPIs) derived from the aggregation of institutional data in 
the financial sector (Evans et al., 2000)21. These MPIs are expected to eventually 
serve as benchmarks for purposes of cross-country comparability and hence 
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feedback into the standard-setting exercise. While such activity is underway, the 
scope of MPIs is being widened to encompass what are termed as Financial 
Soundness Indicators (FSIs). While MPIs seek to provide an assessment and 
monitoring of the strengths and weaknesses of the financial system, FSIs are 
aimed at monitoring the health and soundness of financial institutions and 
markets and of their corporate and household counterparts. Two sets of FSIs have 
been proposed, a ‘core’ set, which is broadly comparable across countries, and an 
‘encouraged’ set, which is more country-specific in nature. The FSI data set 
therefore are aimed to serve two purposes: first, if seeks to develop a set of 
indicators that are broadly comparable across countries (the ‘core’ set), which is 
possible if countries adhere to internationally agreed prudential and accounting 
standards, and second, it allows for internalization of country-specific 
vulnerabilities by promoting the development of an ‘encouraged’ set of 
indicators. Unlike the MPIs therefore, this seeks to avoid the ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach and provide flexibility in the selection of indicators (Sundararajan et al., 
2002)22. 
A practical problem in applying international standards of supervision to 
developing markets is that these standards need to be tailored to suit country-
specific characteristics. For example, the Basel Committee standards for 
prudential norms and supervision of commercial banks were designed for banks 
operating in industrialised countries with developed financial markets and 
efficient legal systems, which could pose problems if applied to developing 
markets where financial markets are not so well-developed. Similar problems are 
likely to arise in other areas where standards already exist such as the operation 
of securities markets and in insurance. With the composition of these standard 
setting bodies being weighed in favour of industrialised economies, recognising 
specific features of developing country markets is at a premium. 
To sum up, the efforts to upgrade the regulatory and supervisory systems in 
developing country markets are likely to result in greater transparency and flow 
of information, resulting in improvements in the functioning of financial markets. 
However, the argument would need to be treated with caution. First, the 
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introduction of a sound supervisory system is no guarantee against a financial 
crisis – crises in various developed country markets with otherwise sound 
supervisory setup is ample testimony to this. Second, there is a growing body of 
thought that opines that the focus of supervision should move away from 
prudential norms and towards enforcement of comprehensive risk management 
systems in banks. Supervision would then focus on the adequacy of risk 
management systems in each bank. However, not only is it utopian to define a 
‘common international standard’ for such an approach, but the fact also remains 
that risk management practices differ widely across the developed and 
developing world: a ‘sophisticated’ approach for developing country banks might 
turn out to be ‘mechanical’ for industrialised country institutions.  
The UN Committee on Development Planning mooted the creation of a 
World Financial Organisation - a supra-national body exercising supervisory 
powers over the financial sector. The G-7 countries opted for a more modest 
alternative of bringing together national authorities of the G-7 countries and other 
major international institutions and other concerned institutions in a Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF), with representatives from IMF, World Bank, Basel 
Committee, IOSCO, IAIS and three representatives from each of the G-7 countries. 
Developing countries however have not been included in the Forum at present 
though it is expected to include some emerging economies at a subsequent stage.  
Meanwhile, current rules of global finance have exacerbated injustice 
between income groups through off shore financial centers (OFCs). Several 
jurisdictions across the world offer low taxation and high confidentiality that are 
mainly geared towards high net-worth individuals. It has been estimated that, for 
selected OFCs, on balance sheet OFC cross-border assets reached a level of US 
$4.6 trillion at end-June 1999 (about 50 percent of total cross-border assets), of 
which US$0.9 trillion in the Caribbean, US$1 trillion in Asia, and most of the 
remaining US$2.7 trillion accounted for by the international financial centers, 
namely London, the U.S. International Banking Facilities (IBFs), and the Japanese 
Offshore Market or JOM (IMF, 2000)23. The supervisory standards in these OFCs 
vary from non-existent to first-class (IMF, 2003)24. The better-regulated centers 
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increasingly see their own self-interest as being to achieve full compliance with 
international regulatory standards. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has 
explored ways to halt criminal money laundering through off-shore finance and 
the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs has since 1998 undertaken some initial 
steps to combat tax evasion in these centers. The Financial Stability Forum, 
through its Working Group on Off-shore Centres, is beginning to give a strong 
push in this direction and devising incentives for compliance.          
 Thus, the evolving scenario for international supervisory arrangements is 
poised to have two major components: 
 
i) The 12 member Basel Committee for Bank Supervision which represents the 
developed world, and which does not have any international mandate for the 
development of standards but has been doing so successfully by partly following 
the democratic process of consultation;   
 
ii) The International Monetary Fund (and the World Bank), which have a wide 
membership, but the decision making process tends to be weighed in favour of 
the developed countries (Griffith-Jones and Kimmis, 2001)25. These institutions are 
being increasingly involved in the enforcement of the Basel standards through the 
exercise of assessing country compliance with the Core Principles (and thus 
potentially the rating of supervisory regimes).  
 
The emerging transnational supervisory arrangements are set to be 
dominated by two bodies, with convex combinations of democratic and 
representativeness. Of course, the regional association of bank supervisors could 
also emerge as a prominent player in the standard-setting exercise by its channels 
of interaction with the BCBS, but this depends on how well these are organized 
and activated in the coming years. And, with consolidated supervision being of 
major concern to bank supervisors and the trend towards creation of ‘super-
regulators’, co-ordination with the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
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(IOSCO), which are also clubs like the BCBS, but have wider membership which 
include the developing countries, will also be important components of the 
framework.  
 Since 1996, the BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO have convened a Joint Forum on 
Financial Conglomerates to promote cooperation between banking, securities and 
insurance supervisors, given that global financial co-operation increasingly 
operate across the three sectors. In accordance with its 1996 mandate from its 
three parent organisations, the Joint Forum reviews various means to facilitate the 
exchange of information between financial supervisors within their own sectors 
and between supervisors in different sectors. The Joint Forum also examines ways 
to enhance supervisory coordination and is working on developing principles 
towards the more effective supervision of regulated firms within financial 
conglomerates. Another initiative along these lines, the Year 2000 Network – a 
creation of the Basel Committee, the BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems, IOSCO and IAIS-aims to ensure a high degree of attention to Year 2000 
issues within the global financial supervisory community. The Year 2000 Network 
shares information regarding regulatory and supervisory strategies; discusses 
contingency measures, and serves as a contact point for national and international 
private sector initiatives. 
These trans-governmental regulatory networks are engaged in a new kind 
of international law making which is not treaty-based, but rather is rooted in 
agreed practices that are shared among the networks’ members. There are no 
binding treaties-these practices are, in a sense, like free software downloadable 
from the Internet. The ‘nationalisation’ of international law occurs when practices 
shared by the networks become institutionalized within individual member 
states. 
Another trans-governmental governance of global finance has emerged in 
recent years through the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The Uruguay Round 
of intergovernmental trade talks (1986-94) produced the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), which extended multilateral liberalisation of 
international commerce, inter alia, to finance. Since 1995, a WTO Committee on 
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Financial Services has overseen the operation of GATS in respect of finance. In 
2000, the WTO launched further multilateral negotiations on trade in services, 
including in the financial area. The schedule of specific commitments of each 
Member involves a positive listing of sectors/sub-sectors and modes of supply 
where the Member desires to undertake specific commitments. Those, which are 
not listed, are not subject to any commitments. Besides, even in the listed 
sector/sub-sector and any particular mode, Members may keep the commitments 
as ‘unbound’, which implies no commitments. In the listed sectors/sub-sectors 
and modes of supply, where they take some commitments, Members can 
schedule some limitations on market access, national treatment and on additional 
commitments as permitted under relevant provisions of GATS. Thus, there is 
considerable flexibility provided to Members under this approach. Some 
developed countries have been advocating the inclusion of prudential norms 
within the ambit of GATS. Such commitments, once included, are likely to have 
two major fallouts: first, it would be binding on countries to comply with them 
within their national jurisdictions, and secondly, it would be irreversible.   
The more informal type of trans-governmental network is created through 
agreements between domestic regulatory agencies. The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), the fastest growing international legal instrument in the 
last decade or so, serves as the basis for this type of network. MoUs, in essence, 
are agreements between regulators in specific and discrete subject areas that do 
not carry legally binding burdens. Representative examples of MoUs come from 
two US regulatory agencies-the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the Justice Department. The proliferation of MoUs between regulatory agencies 
results from their flexibility and speed-they are frequently informal in tone, often 
avoiding legalistic language, while specifying modes of cooperation, information 
sharing and establishing a framework for ongoing networks.  
 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY REFORM 
A surprising feature of the evolving arrangements is that despite their 
gracious inclusion in the bits and pieces, developing countries remain on the 
fringes of the transnational arrangements. Flagging this as an 'over-arching' issue 
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in the arrangements of financial co-operation in the new millennium, Jalan 
(1999)26 has succinctly observed ‘the recent moves to involve developing countries 
more closely in the discussions on the New Financial Architecture are, therefore, 
welcome. But these efforts have not yet gone far enough. The institutional 
arrangements for decision-making on the new financial architecture still remain 
too heavily weighted in favour of industrial countries’. 
Given the increasingly shared concern for some degree of convergence in 
standards and the attempts being made to emulate international best practices, 
bank supervision will remain centre-stage for some time. While the consultative 
process which is being followed by the BCBS and the voluntary adherence of its 
norms is indeed an exemplary model of transnational arrangements, it has so far 
not really been tested.  
As Davies (2000)27 has pointed out, it is the fact of voluntary membership 
and the lack of a mandate that has led to the BCBS not being able to enforce its 
rules. As a consequence, there is a pressing need at the international level to take a 
fresh look at the institutional structure of international financial regulation. 
 The simplest way forward, is of, course a gradual expansion in the 
membership of the BCBS by taking in some non G-10 countries as its members 
which have demonstrated their keenness and ability to adopt international best 
practice and to shape the international agenda. Alternatively, the countries 
chairing the Regional Groupings could also be included as members. Since the 
Chair rotates among member countries, this would provide increased coverage in 
representation. Another more drastic variation could be that the BCBS be replaced 
by full-fledged body of International Bank Supervisors with membership of all 
nations, which would set standards, monitor compliance through empowered 
committees, like the IOSCO has done. The IOSCO too is a 'club' like the BCBS and 
the IAIS, but has around 150 member countries and operates through several 
committees wherein the Chair is rotated. IOSCO’s members come from a variety 
of different places, including national securities commissions, stock exchanges 
and international and regional organisations. IOSCO focuses primarily on 
encouraging the development of common accounting standards that issuers of 
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securities can employ to offer stock in multiple countries without having to 
comply with the separate disclosure requirements of each (Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2: Key Standards in Financial Regulation and Supervision 
Area Key Standard Issuing Body 
Banking  Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision BCBS 
Securities  Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation IOSCO 
Insurance  Insurance Core Principles IAIS 
Conglomerates Supervision of Financial Conglomerates  Joint Forum 
 
Another variant could be that the BCBS as it exists, with some 
representation from the non G-10, could be responsible to a larger body. The 
larger body could be the regional groupings of national supervisors, with each of 
these being represented on the Committee. Alternately, it could be a body like the 
IMF, which already has a membership of nations, a stake in financial sector 
surveillance and which is developing the skills in bank supervision.   
Probably what is more crucial at this stage is not the final solution but 
simply the fact that the membership issue needs to be brought to center stage. 
This debate will also lead to a focus on the need for a clarity of roles amongst the 
different international bodies which are now involved in some manner with the 
supervision of the financial sector and lend strength to the Basel Committee’s role 
as standard setter.  
The globalisation of banking operations and the attendant crises has 
meanwhile shifted focus to what is popularly called the ‘international financial 
architecture’ (Kenen, 2001)28. Attention has come to be focused on three 
interdependent sets of issues: crisis prevention, crisis management and crisis 
resolution. Commentators have suggested a gamut of solutions to tackle the 
problems. With respect to crisis prevention, proposal has been advocated to 
establish an international super-regulator. As for crisis management, recent 
suggestions include the creation of an international authority for insuring 
international investors against debt defaults (Fischer, 1999)29. And finally, in the 
area of crisis resolution, there have been suggestions regarding the constitution of 
a global restructuring agency and an international bankruptcy court. As evident, 
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the range of proposals is varied, covering diverse areas, ranging from creating a 
new body for international regulatory oversight to an international LLR to 
integrating all the existing clubs and bodies under an umbrella organization (See, 
for instance, the discussion in Rogoff, 1999)30. What should not get lost in the 
debate is that the bank supervisors from developing/emerging economies need to 
have a greater representation in the final format, since eventually the 
responsibility for the soundness and stability of the banking system is ultimately 
placed at their doors.  
While the debate may have begun on the evolution of the new supervisory 
architecture, a prominent question that has come to the forefront has been the role 
of the official versus the private sector in dealing with financial crises. The large 
official support packages of the late 1990s (US $48.8 billion for Mexico in 1995, US 
$17.2 billion for Thailand in 1997, US $42.3 billion for Indonesia in 1997, US $58.4 
billion for Korea in 1997 and subsequently, US $41.6 billion for Brazil in 1998) 
prompted critiques that such public support created moral hazard. The bilateral 
contributions for Korea and Indonesia were only a “second stage backup”. The 
inadequacy of the financing provided in East Asia has been identified as one of 
the reasons why the IMF programmes did not succeed in stabilising the situation 
in the initial stages (Lane et al., 199931). With the role of the IMF fairly 
circumscribed due to its usable resources (around US $150 billion) being well 
short of the external debt of developing countries, estimated at well over US $ 2 
trillion (Clementi, 2000)32, observers have suggested that there should be more 
‘private sector involvement’ in financing crises (Haldane, 199933; Roubini, 200034) 
and in the same vein (Eichengreen, 199935) have advocated improving crisis 
resolution mechanisms through changes in the law governing private debt 
contracts, or through officially sanctioned standstills as a way to resolve investor 
panics. A more recent proposal for an international (quasi-) lender of last resort is 
outlined in Lerrick and Meltzer (2003)36. Suggestions have also been offered 
regarding a ‘middle way’ between full IMF insurance and no insurance at all 
(King, 1999)37, which has also not been without its detractors (Krugman, 1999)38. 
From the supervisory standpoint, the banking system has stated that they do not 
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intend to take any responsibility for financial crises. The view to this effect is 
evidenced from a communication by the Institute for International Finance, a 
Washington-based lobby group of major international banks, to the IMF, which 
observed that banks and governments have distinct responsibilities: banks have 
only the responsibility to increase shareholder value and make profits out of 
capital, governments have the responsibility for financial stability and promoting 
social objectives. This, in effect, has prompted supervisory authorities to demand 
greater transparency by improving data from governments to international 
financial operators so as to improve ‘market discipline’ whereby financial 
operators would be able to detect the problems in time to change their risk-taking 
and avoid a crisis (Flannery, 1998)39.  Pertinent to mention in this context that the 
issue of disclosure and market discipline has been prominent in the analysis of, 
and the recommendations to deal with, hedge funds (and the more general highly 
leveraged institutions). While work on this front has been underway at the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (the Brockmeijer Report), more definitive 
answers to the problems of high leverage are being sought by the FSF.     
 
IV. POLICY CONCERNS  
While the role of standard-setter has been thrust upon the Basel Committee 
and the IMF has come to acquire the role of the global supervisory authority by 
monitoring compliance with best practices, the testing ground for these roles 
could be manifested in two areas of recent focus - the implementation of the New 
Capital Accord and the concerted action against money laundering by the 
international financial system.  
Issues with regard to the latter are still emerging, but they largely center 
around the question of the domain of operations of different agencies, with rules 
and guidance coming out of the Basel Committee, the Bretton Wood institutions, 
the Financial Action Task Force and other voluntary inter-bank initiatives.  The 
issues have become further complicated by the fact that the target group of the 
regulations are not just banks and the supervisory concerns are to be addressed 
not only by supervisors of the bank and non-bank financial system, but also by 
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the Ministries of Finance and their Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). The IMF 
has been working on a scheme to streamline the reporting methodology for Anti 
Money Laundering (AML)/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), which 
seeks to improve upon its earlier methodology, which would, in essence expand 
its surveillance agenda.  
In comparison, the issues with regard to the New Capital Adequacy 
framework are better-enunciated and understood. The multi-layered structure of 
the proposed capital standard, with a variety of approaches to accommodate 
banks and jurisdictions with varied resources, expertise and risk profiles, has 
become a source of debate. To elucidate, the centerpiece of the proposal is to base 
the risk weights for assigning capital to bank assets based upon either ratings 
awarded by external ratings agencies or the internal rating based (or IRB) 
approach. Most developing countries have not developed external ratings 
infrastructure and the penetration of ratings among bank borrowers is very low, 
and hence their banks cannot benefit from the additional risk sensitivity provided 
by the former. Under the IRB approach, the regulatory capital requirement would 
be based on a bank’s own internal assessment of each borrower’s credit quality. 
Under this approach, a bank would need to have several core inputs for each 
credit facility: the probability of default (PD) for borrowers assigned to each 
internal borrower grade; the expected loss rate, given a default (LGD), 
appropriate for each type of exposure; the expected amount of exposure at default 
(EAD) for each type of exposure and the associated capital to meet selected 
solvency standards, reflecting undrawn credit lines and the maturity of the 
exposure. The supervisors will evaluate the risk-classification and risk-estimation 
processes at each bank using the Advanced IRB approach and if the processes are 
found to be acceptable, those classifications and associated capital needs will be 
the basis for minimum regulatory capital requirements. The implementation of 
such sophisticated processes will impose requirements on banks and more so on 
the supervisors to validate and guide in the development of IRB models as also 
provide PD, LGD and EAD estimates for different approaches and ensure 
consistency in the ratings given by the rating agencies. The new Accord has 
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proposed that the risk weights would be based on the borrowers’ external credit 
ratings, when available  This, in its wake, would demand high degree of 
supervisory skills. Both the paucity of skilled supervisory resources and the lack 
of data and information systems in banks in developing countries implies that 
banks in several jurisdiction might not be in a position to implement the new 
framework. This in turn, could lead them to assessed as non-compliant with the 
Accord and bear the consequences of such assessment in the international 
markets. This situation does not compare favourably with the existing position. 
The 1988 Accord, which was to be applied by Basel member countries by 1992, 
has become a de-facto international standard with a majority of supervisors having 
taken steps to implement this in the last decade.  
Apart from the issue of non-compliance and its attendant problems, recent 
literature on the subject has also drawn other scenarios which could affect banks 
in non G-10 jurisdictions.  One hypothesis is that lending to the developing world 
could decrease. Alternately, since the calibration of risk weights is considerably 
finer than that of the 1988 Accord, especially under the IRB approach, this could 
raise the cost of capital under this approach. Since most leading international 
banks could be expected to follow this approach, this would lower incentives for 
banks to lend to these countries. Another hypothesis goes further to suggest that 
developing countries could hanker for their own Accord because of the inability 
to apply the proposals in the new framework! Of course, there is no evidence to 
suggest that either of these two scenarios could play out in the future, and in fact 
the real headaches for bank supervisors could come simply from the cross-border 
implementation issues. As it stands, the new framework allows for many areas of 
national discretion and three clearly defined approaches. With the two hundred 
odd countries implementing a mix of the eligible approaches with different 
applications of discretion, there could many areas of divergence between the 
treatment accorded to the same bank by home and host supervisors, which could 
impose additional costs upon the international banks.    
 Commentators have suggested some divergence in views within the 
membership of the Basel Committee itself with some national regulators 
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undecided on how widely to apply the Basel capital framework. In the words of 
Mayer (2001)40, “the greater complexity of the new accord, at least with respect to 
the IRB options, suggests that it should cover a narrower range of banks: those 
that have been active pursuers of capital arbitrage, those that have made-or can 
make-the greatest advances in risk measurement and management, and those for 
whom the adequacy of the current standard is most in question”. The same view 
has been echoed by Schroder, German Chancellor, who was reported to have 
observed that Basel II was “unacceptable to Germany” (The Economist, 200141). 
This is reported to have to do with Mittelstand, the 3 million small and medium-
sized companies that constitute the backbone of the economy. The Basel II 
formulae for credit risk are based on credit ratings applied to company debt, 
either by rating agencies or internally by banks themselves. Since this is not the 
preferred method of rating adopted by the 2,800 odd German banks, equipping 
banks to adopt such rating procedures would drive up their cost of lending. With 
the Basel membership being divided on the scope and applicability of the new 
Accord, there seems to be a greater need than ever before for a consensus from the 
rest of the world, implying, in other words, a greater say of the non G-10 
countries in the initial stages of operationalisation of the new Accord.  
At a time when there is still limited information as to what constitutes 
international best practice despite the flagship work done by the BCBS and few 
internationally agreed standards, it remains a moot question whether 
sophistication in these standards could impair their universal application. What is 
for certain that the national supervisors continue to look upon the Basel 
Committee to set standards which will be globally relevant and take into account 
the differences in the stages of development of the banking systems and 
supervisory capabilities in the developing world. While the BCBS has walked this 
tightrope with élan till now, the events of the next few years will decide whether 
membership issues could affect the assimilation of international standards in bank 
supervision.  
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